Today I finally read all seven of the affidavits provided by the former employees of Bank of America…Many of us went through exactly the same horror as described in these affidavits. I remember my desperation while trying to do everything right, everything by the rule this criminal enterprise requested from me. While we were trying to please these unscrupulous greedy criminals, they were doing everything to destroy or hide our paperwork and push so many people toward foreclosures…and you know what the saddest thing of all is – they are doing it even now while I’m writing this and while you are reading it…They will do it tomorrow and the day after tomorrow, until all of you wake up and say NO MORE!
I’ve tried to prepare a little digest from all seven affidavits so that it will be easier and quicker to get a glimpse behind the scenes. However, I do recommend that all of you find some time and read the complete affidavits which are published here:
Exhibit 1 – William E. Wilson, Jr. (Charlotte, NC)
“Bank of America instructed its Customer Relationship Managers, underwriters and other employees to enter a reason that would justify declining the modification to the Treasury Department. Justifications commonly included claiming that the homeowner had failed to return requested documents or had failed to make payments. In reality, these justifications were untrue. I personally reviewed hundreds of files in which the computer systems showed that the homeowner had fulfilled a Trial Period Plan and was entitled to a permanent loan modification, but was nevertheless declined for a permanent modification during a blitz.”
Exhibit 2 – Simone Gordon (Orange, NJ)
“My colleagues and I were supervised by “Team Leaders” who were, in turn, supervised by “Site Leaders.” Site leaders regularly told us that the more we delayed the HAMP modification process, the more fees Bank of America would collect. We were regularly drilled that it was our job to maximize fees for the Bank by fostering and extending delay of the HAMP modification process by any means we could – this included by lying to customers.
Bank of America monitored my colleagues and me very closely. Team Leaders and Site Leaders walked the call room floor throughout the day wearing headsets that they would use to plug in and listen into a call without warning. Employees who were caught not carrying out the delay strategies that Bank of America instructed were subject to discipline including termination.”
Exhibit 3 – Theresa Terrelonge (Grand Prarie, TX)
“Most, if not all of my colleagues and supervisors did not have suitable training, education, or experience in modifying mortgages, and certainly not regarding HAMP requirements and procedures.
When Bank of America purchased loans from other servicers, including when it bought the servicer itself – as it did with Wilshire Credi, Bank of America forced the homeowners to restart the modification process. When a homeowner called regarding a modification started with another servicer, my co-workers and I were instructed to say that Bank of America had no record of the modification or of the payments the homeowner already made under the modification. We were instructed to make this statement even when Bank of America’s system showed the homeowners’ modification and previous payments, and even when the system showed that the homeowners had completed the trial process with the previous servicer and should have received a permanent modification.”
Exhibit 4 – Steven Cupples (Fort Worth, TX)
“An obvious problem I noticed almost immediately was that Bank of America had not changed its regular loan servicing programs to account for HAMP. A delinquent loan would progress from regular servicing, to collections, loss mitigation, and to foreclosure, just as it had before HAMP started.
Loans that were eligible to be considered under HAMP, and even loans in which the borrowers fulfilled Trial Period Plans, were still sent to the foreclosure department. The system Bank of America used either made no sense, or was nothing more than an effort to give a false appearance of complying with HAMP requirements when it was not.
Employees who challenged or questioned the ethics of Bank of America’s practice for any reason were often fired. There was an extremely high level of turnover in every HAMP related Bank of America department that I saw. Employees worked in fear of losing their jobs if they called any of Bank of America’s practices into question.”
Exhibit 5 – Recorda Simon (Dallas County, TX)
“Approximately 4 in 10 of the borrowers I spoke with had been set up on temporary modifications and were current on their modification payments but had not received a permanent modification. The borrowers, with a few exceptions, had made more than three monthly payments and had returned all of the requested supporting documents, but had not received permanent modifications.
I saw instances where Bank of America sent borrowers who were current on their payment loan modifications foreclosure notices. In some cases, Bank of America did not update its system to implement the terms of a permanent modification, Bank of America foreclosed on homes of borrowers who were not delinquent on their permanent loan modification payments.
I was often instructed to give borrower misinformation about the status of a modification application. I was told to tell borrowers that their applications were still under review even after a decision to grant to deny the application was already noted in the system.”
Exhibit 6 – Erica Brown ( Dallas, TX)
“Bank of America‘s practice is to string homeowners along with no apparent intention of providing the permanent loan modification it promises. The process Bank of America uses, and the instructions it gives its employees, appear to be designed to avoid modifying mortgage loans.
Bank of America regularly ignored completed loan modifications and did not treat the loan as having been modified in its computer system. Even after a homeowner signed and returned modification documents, Bank of America’s computer system continued to show the loan as delinquent. Bank of America continued to report homeowners as delinquent to credit reporting agencies, and went forward with foreclosure.”
Exhibit 7 – Bert Sheeks (Boulder, CO)
The Urban department at which I worked was daily given a grid consisting of hundreds or even thousands of files with instructions to close the files. Our job was to find any pretext in the file to justify closing – whether or not justified.
The written notices that borrowers were missing documents and requests that they submit additional documents were often suspect, and likely sent without proper due diligence as to whether the documents were indeed missing.”